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Abstract
We examine the growth implications of bank runs. To do so, we construct an
endogenous growth model in which bank runs occur with positive probability in
equilibrium. In this setting, a bank run has a permanent effect on the capital stock
and on the level of output. In addition, the possibility of a bank run changes the
portfolio choice of banks and thereby affects the long-run growth rate. We consider
two different equilibrium selection rules. In the first, a run is triggered by sunspots
and occurs with a fixed probability. A higher probability of a run in this case leads
banks to hold a more liquid portfolio, which decreases total investment and thereby
reduces capital formation. Hence the economy grows slower, even when a run does
not occur. Under the second selection rule, the probability of a run is influenced by
the bank’s portfolio choice. This leads banks to place more resources in long-term
investment, and the economy both grows faster and experiences fewer runs.
1 The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond nor those of the Federal Reserve System.
1 Introduction
Bank runs and banking crises in general are an important economic phenomenon, both historically and in
recent years. These crises are typically accompanied by costly economic disruptions, with estimates of the
cost of recent crises ranging as high as 40-55% of GDP.2Much has been written about these crises, including
analyses of their possible causes and their many effects on the economy. We focus on one particular facet:
the effect of the possibility of bank runs on capital formation and thereby on economic growth. While
there is now a fair amount of empirical evidence on the effects of banking crises on economic growth, not
much theoretical work has been done on the subject. In this paper we present an endogenous growth model
where bank runs occur with positive probability in equilibrium. This allows us to examine also how the
possibility of a run changes the decisions made by agents in the economy and how these changes affect
long-run economic growth.
Our model of the behavior of banks is in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig [11], which highlights
the role of the banking system in creating liquidity by taking in short-term deposits and making long-term
investments. In particular, Diamond and Dybvig [11] shows how demand deposit contracts can easily lead
to a situation where there are multiple equilibria of the game played by a bank’s depositors (the “post-
deposit” game), one where a bank run occurs and one where it does not. The optimal contract for the bank
to offer in the “pre-deposit” phase therefore depends critically on how an equilibrium of the post-deposit
game is selected. One approach is to assume that agents coordinate their actions on a sunspot variable, a
publicly-observed random variable that is extrinsic in the sense that it has no effect on the fundamentals of
the economy.3 Peck and Shell [19] shows that if a sunspot-induced run is sufficiently unlikely, depositors
can prefer a contract that permits runs, even when a broad set of possible deposit contracts is considered.4
It is always feasible in this setting for the bank to choose a contract that prevents runs, but it may be too
costly from an ex ante point of view.
We have kept our model of bank behavior as simple as possible, while retaining the spirit of the Peck-
Shell [19] analysis. In particular, we restrict banks to offer simple demand deposit contracts in order to
make the problem tractable even when there is a large number of depositors. There is a large literature on
2 These are the estimates given in Caprio and Klingebiel [6] for the Chilean and Argentine crises, respectively, in the early
1980s. For a large number of other crises, they report costs in excess of 10% of GDP.
3 In a recent comprehensive study of modern banking crises, Boyd et al. [4] conclude that the available evidence strongly points
toward a sunspots-based explanation for the cause of these crises.
4 This type of result is shown for a restricted set of deposit contracts in Cooper and Ross [10].
2
the roles of the banking system and its microeconomic structure,5 and it is not our intention to contribute to
these issues. Rather, we aim to highlight the basic growth implications of bank runs that are likely to follow
from any model where the activities of the banking system matter for real allocations. Banks in our model
take as given an equilibrium selection rule, and they offer the demand deposit contract that maximizes the
expected utility of their depositors. The only critical aspect of our model of the banking system is that, as
in Peck and Shell [19], banks may choose a contract that admits a run equilibrium to the post-deposit game.
In addition to choosing the contract that it offers depositors, the bank must also allocate its portfolio
between storage and investment in new capital. Investment is illiquid in the sense that much of its value is
lost if the project is terminated early.6 We show how the possibility of a bank run influences the process
of capital formation in two distinct ways. The first is obvious: when a run occurs the bank liquidates
investment, which reduces the amount of new capital created in that period. The second is more subtle but
no less important: since the bank is aware of the possibility of a run, it places a higher fraction of its reserves
in storage. Because there is a large loss from liquidating investment, holding a more liquid portfolio allows
the bank to serve a larger number of customers during a run and hence provides depositors with insurance
against a bad realization of the sunspot signal. However, resources placed in storage do not produce new
capital, and hence a more liquid bank portfolio implies a lower capital stock in the following period. Thus
the mere possibility of a bank run reduces capital formation, even when a run does not occur.
The long-run impact of the possibility of bank runs depends critically on whether or not the actions of
the bank affect the long-run growth rate of the economy. We embed our banking model in an Ak model of
growth,7 which generates the following results. Because the marginal product of capital is constant, the path
of real output is history dependent and a bank run necessarily has a permanent effect. This implies that the
true cost of a crisis is much larger than a short-run estimate (such as those given in the first paragraph above)
would indicate.8 In addition, even small changes in banks’ portfolios will change the long-run growth rate
and therefore have large effects on the level of real output over time.
We also examine the issue of equilibrium selection in the post-deposit game in more detail, using an
approach that we have developed elsewhere (Ennis and Keister [12], [13]). The standard sunspots approach
assumes that the probability of a run is a fixed constant (as long as both equilibria exist). In our approach,
the probability of a run depends on the strength of the incentive for agents to run as measured by the risk
5 Freixas and Rochet [15] provide a detailed summary and list of references for this literature.
6 This modification of the Diamond-Dybvig approach was taken in Cooper and Ross [10], which showed that the possiblity of
runs could lead the bank to hold excess liquidity.
7 In this we follow Bencivenga and Smith [3], which studies the role of financial intermediaries in promoting growth. Our
model is in many ways similar to theirs, but they do not examine the possibility of bank runs. A key characteristic of the Ak model
is that it has no transitional dynamics, which greatly simplifies our computations. The model can be viewed as approximating the
balanced growth path of richer models. See Antinofi, Keister, and Shell [1]
8 Boyd, Kwak, and Smith [5] provide evidence that the effects of modern banking crises are indeed very long lived.
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factor of the run equilibrium. (A low risk factor corresponds to a strongly risk-dominant equilibrium.)
When the risk factor is very low, an agent would choose to run for a wide range of beliefs about the actions
of other agents, and therefore we say that a run is relatively likely.9 The risk factor is determined largely by
the contract offered by the bank. We show through examples that when the bank recognizes that its choice
of contract affects the probability of a run, it holds a less liquid portfolio. This may seem surprising at
first. However, it is intuitively clear that this must be the case. In order to reduce the probability of a run,
the bank must decrease the expected payoff of running (relative to the payoff of waiting). When the bank
places more funds in investment and less in storage, the payoff of waiting when there is no run increases.
The payoff of waiting when there is a run does not change (it is zero). Lower liquidity levels therefore
imply a higher expected payoff of waiting and hence lead agents to be more likely to wait. We also show
that the more sensitive the probability of run is to the portfolio of the bank, the more resources the bank
puts into investment. As we mentioned above, less liquid bank portfolios lead to more capital formation
and therefore higher growth rates. Hence there is no tradeoff between growth and stability is this model;
less liquid portfolios bring higher growth with fewer bank runs. It should be born in mind, however, that
less liquid portfolios provide less insurance for depositors against high early withdrawal demand. This is
what prevents banks from eliminating runs altogether.
Finally, we show that economies with more productive investment technologies will tend to grow faster
for two reasons. First, a more productive investment technology induces the bank to invest more and
generate more capital, which results in higher growth. This is completely standard. In addition, however,
higher investment reduces the incentive for depositors to run and therefore also brings a lower likelihood of
a run. As a result, the average growth rate over a long time period will be higher because runs will occur
less often. In this way, the model provides an amplification mechanism for differences in the productivity
of investment.
The outline of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The the next section we describe our model in
detail. In section 3, we describe the equilibrium behavior of the economy and compute this behavior for
some numerical examples. We also trace the implications of the possibility of bank runs for growth under
the standard sunspots approach. In section 4, we present our alternate model of equilibrium selection and
examine how this affects the decisions of banks and the long-run behavior of the economy. In section 5, we
offer some concluding remarks.
9 Ennis and Keister [12] shows how an equilibrium selection rule of this form is the natural outcome of an adaptive learning
process in a stochastic environment.
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2 The Model
The economy consists of an infinite sequence of two-period lived, overlapping generations, plus an initial
old generation. There is a single, perishable consumption good, which is produced using capital and labor.
Agents in the initial old generation are each endowed with k1 units of capital, and have preferences that
are strictly increasing in consumption in the single period of their life. In each time period t = 1, 2, . . . , a
continuum of agents with unit mass is born. Each of these agents is endowed with one unit of labor when
young and nothing when old, and each is either patient or impatient. Preferences are given by
u (c1,t, c2,t) =
(
b1
γ
(c1,t)
γ
b2
γ
(c1,t + c2,t)
γ
)
if the consumer is
½
impatient
patient
¾
. (1)
A fraction φ of consumers know at birth that they are patient. We refer to these as type I agents. The
remaining (type II) agents will learn their type at the end of the first period of their lives, while there is still
time to consume that period but after investment decisions are made.10 Each type II agent in generation t is
impatient with probability ut and patient with probability (1− ut). The realization of types is independent
across agents, so that ut is also the fraction of the population of type II agents in generation t that is
impatient. The probability ut is the realization of a random variable that gives the size of the aggregate
liquidity shock in each period; high values of ut correspond to high liquidity demand. We assume that u is
independently and identically distributed over time, and that the distribution has a density function f .11
2.1 Production and investment
There is a large number of competitive firms who produce output using capital and labor as inputs according
to the production function
Yt = k
1−θ
t K
θ
t L
1−θ
t ,
where kt is the average capital-labor ratio in the economy at time t, which is taken as given by each indi-
vidual firm. Adding the capital externality is one way of preventing the marginal product of capital from
falling too low as the economy grows and thereby generating endogenous growth.12 There are many other,
more interesting models with this property, including models of inventive activity. The externality-based
approach allows us to keep the model simple and to abstract from transitional dynamics after a crisis, since
10 We are thus collapsing the first two periods of the Diamond and Dybvig [11] setup into the first period of a young agent’s life.
11 Most of our analysis could be done under the assumption that u is a known constant over time, as in Cooper and Ross [10].
However, as Diamond and Dybvig [11] point out, in this case a simple suspension of convertibility is a costless way to eliminate
the run equilibrium. When u is stochastic, however, the total suspension scheme is no longer optimal and the run equilibrium can
exist under the optimal contract, as shown in Peck and Shell [19].
12 The assumption that the exponent on the externality term is exactly equal to labor’s share of income is of course special.
Antinolfi, Keister and Shell [1] identify it as a bifurcation point in parameter space.
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our economy will always be on a balanced growth path. Nevertheless, our banking model could easily be
embedded in a richer model of growth. We discuss this extension briefly in section 5.
Capital is, of course, durable and therefore is one way for young agents to save. There are two other ways
of saving, which we refer to as “storage” and “investment.” One unit of consumption placed into storage at
time t yields n units of consumption if liquidated later in period t and n2 units of consumption if held until
period t + 1. This storage can be thought of as a liquid asset such as money, with n < 1 representing an
inflation tax.
One unit of consumption placed into investment in period t yieldsR units of capital in period t+1. This
technology is the only way that new capital can be produced. If investment is liquidated early (at the end
of period t), it yields x < n units of consumption per unit invested. Hence investment is an illiquid asset,
which yields a higher return than storage if held to maturity but a lower return if liquidated prematurely.
2.2 Timing of events
Period t begins with a stock of capital kt owned by old agents. This capital is rented out to firms, who
also employ young agents and thereby produce output. After production takes place, old agents sell the
undepreciated capital. Letting qt denote the price of capital, an old agent then has (rt + (1− δ) qt) units
of consumption for each unit of capital she began the period with. She consumes all of this and exits the
economy.
Type I young agents know that they are patient, and therefore will save all of their income in whatever
asset yields the highest return. The return to using a unit of consumption to purchase existing capital is
rt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1
qt
.
The return from investing a unit of consumption in new capital formation is
R (rt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1) ≡ ψt+1.
The decision rule of a type I agent is therefore the following:
Invest in



existing capital
either
new capital


 as qt



>
=
<



1
R
. (2)
Since both strategies yield capital in period t+1, the agent simply chooses the option that yields more units
of capital per unit of consumption invested.
The interesting investment problem is that of Type II agents. Because these agents do not know their
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preferences until after the opportunities to invest have passed, they will form coalitions that we call banks.
The agents will choose to deposit their income in the bank, and the bank will place some of these resources
in storage and the rest in investment in new capital.13 We assume that banks offer simple demand deposit
contracts, and that suspension of convertibility is not possible. Each depositor chooses to withdraw her
funds from the bank in either period t or period t + 1. Agents who choose period t arrive at the bank in
random order. The bank offers a fixed rate of return on deposits withdrawn in this period, and it must honor
this contractual obligation unless it has completely run out of resources.14 Whatever resources remain in
period t + 1 are divided among the remaining depositors. The bank therefore can be viewed as choosing
what fraction of deposits to place in storage (we denote this fraction ηt) and what return to offer to agents
who withdraw their deposits in period t (assuming it has not run out of resources; we denote this a1,t). These
two numbers completely determine the payoffs received by a depositor under each possible contingency.
After the bank sets the contract and type II agents have deposited their income, we move to what Peck
and Shell [19] call the “post-deposit game.” Each agent learns whether she is impatient or patient, and then
decides whether to go to the bank in period t or in period t + 1. Following the literature, we focus on
symmetric, pure strategy equilibria of the game. There are two possible equilibria of this type: one where
all agents go to the bank at the end of period t (a run) and one where only impatient consumers go (no run).
In choosing the optimal deposit contract to offer, the bank needs to know how likely each of these outcomes
is. The same is true of an agent deciding whether or not she wants to deposit her savings in the bank. The
standard approach is to assume that agents coordinate their actions based on the realization of a sunspot
signal, so that a run occurs with a fixed probability (assuming that the contract offered by the bank is such
that both equilibria exist). Our interest is in both this approach and a modified version of it in which the
probability of a run depends on the parameters of the deposit contract. We begin by defining an equilibrium
selection mechanism.15
Definition: An equilibrium selection mechanism (ESM) is a function that assigns a probability π to the run
equilibrium and (1− π) to the no-run equilibrium for each possible deposit contract. These probabilities
must be feasible, meaning that π = 0 holds if the run equilibrium does not exist for a particular contract
and π = 1 holds if the no-run equilibrium does not exist.
13 We do not allows the bank to purchase existing capital. However, the extreme illiquidity of this asset will make it a dominated
strategy in equilibrium.
14 Our contract is not fully optimal. Analyzing the optimal contract with a continuum of agents is difficult, in part because
increasing the consumption of an individual agent is costless. Peck and Shell [19] have a finite number of agents and show, in an
environment similar to ours, that there are runs in equilibrium. Because we study a competitive economy, the number of agents in
our model must be large, and having a continuum simplifies the analysis. Our simple contracts lead to equilibrium bank runs in the
spirit of Peck and Shell [19], and we believe that the gain from allowing for more complex contracts would be small.
15 See Ennis and Keister [13] for a detailed discussion of the equilibrium selection mechanism approach.
7
More generally, an ESM assigns a probability distribution over the set of equilibria of the post-deposit
game to each possible deposit contract. This definition is more general than the standard sunspots approach
in that the probability can vary continuously with the parameters of the contract, instead of being a fixed
constant. The specification is simplified here by the fact that there are at most two (symmetric, pure strategy)
equilibria, and hence the support of the distribution has at most two points. We should emphasize that while
we speak of “selecting” between the two equilibria, the actual allocations in each equilibrium depend on
the contract chosen by the bank. Hence the resulting stochastic equilibrium allocations are not (mere)
randomizations over the allocations in the certainty equilibria. The possibility of a bank run will affect the
contract chosen by the bank and will therefore affect the growth rate even if a run does not actually occur.
The feasibility constraints on the ESM are simply a way of including two natural constraints on the
bank’s problem. As is common in the literature, the bank will be able to choose a contract such that the
run equilibrium does not exist. For such contracts, it recognizes that π = 0 holds and hence the no-run
equilibrium will obtain. In addition, if the bank is not careful the contract might be such that patient
agents always prefer to run; this would usually be referred to as a violation of the incentive compatibility
constraint (which requires patient agents to prefer to wait if other patient agents are waiting). In this case
the ESM would deliver π = 1, and the bank would recognize that such a contract could only lead to a run.
Hence the incentive compatibility constraint is naturally embedded in the ESM approach. Beyond these two
restrictions, the function π reflects the properties of the equilibrium selection process, whatever that may
be. Note that the value of π cannot depend on ut, since ut is not known when agents choose their strategies
in period t.16
2.3 The bank’s problem
We assume that there is free entry into banking, so that competition will drive a bank to maximize the
expected utility of depositors. The problem of the bank formed in period t can then be written as
max
a1,t,ηt
π (a1,t, ηt)
Z 1
0
ut
γ
(ub1 + (1− u) b2) aγ1,tf (u) du+
(1− π (a1,t, ηt))
ÃZ ut
0
b1u
γ
aγ1,tf (u) du+
Z 1
ut
b1ut
γ
aγ1,tf (u) du+
Z ut
0
b2 (1− u)
γ
aγ2,tf (u) du
!
subject to
ut = max
µ
ηtn
a1,t
, 1
¶
16 The probability could, however, depend on past realizations of u.We do not investigate this possibility here.
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ut = max
µ
ηtn+ (1− ηt)x
a1,t
, 1
¶
a1,t ≥ 0
0 ≤ ηt ≤ 1
and
a2,t =
(
ηtn
2+(1−ηt)ψt+1−nua1,t
1−u
ηtn+(1−ηt)x−ua1,t
1−u ψt+1
)
as
½
u ≤ ut
ut ≤ u ≤ ut
¾
.
Notice that the form on the utility function is such that the size of the deposit made by the agent (which will
equal the wage) cancels out of the objective and hence does not matter for the solution. This is important
because, as the economy grows, wages and therefore deposits will grow. We see here that this growth does
not affect the bank’s decision problem.
Before describing the objective function, we introduce some additional notation and describe the con-
straints. Let αst (u) denote the fraction of the stored goods that are paid out in period t in the no-run
equilibrium. Similarly, let αit (u) denote the fraction of investment that is liquidated early and paid out
in period t in the no-run equilibrium. Both of these fractions depend on the contract (ηt, a1,t). Because
x < n < R holds, the bank will never choose to pay agents withdrawing in period t with liquidated invest-
ment when stored goods are available. In other words, αit > 0 implies αst = 1. Hence the first constraint
defines ut as the value of u at which, for the given values of ηt and a1,t, all stored goods have been given
to withdrawing agents but no investment has been liquidated (αst (ut) = 1 and αit (ut) = 0). The second
constraint defines ut as the point at which all investment has been liquidated and the bank has just run out
of resources (αst
¡
ut
¢
= αit
¡
ut
¢
= 1). Hence if the realization of u is ut (or greater), agents arriving at
the bank in period t + 1 will receive nothing. The next two constraints are obvious bounds on the choice
variables, and the final constraint simply says that the resources remaining in the bank at period t + 1 are
divided equally among the agents choosing to withdraw in that period.
Turning to the objective function, the first term gives the expected utility of an agent in the event of a
bank run (and therefore is multiplied by the probability of a run π). Because the agent’s place in line is
random and the first ut depositors to arrive are served during a run, ut also gives the individual probability
of being served. With probability u the agent will truly be impatient and hence have preference parameter
b1, while with probability (1− u) she will be patient and will have parameter b2. All agents who are served
receive the rate of return a1,t on their deposits. The remaining term in the objective function gives the
expected utility of a depositor when there is no run (and therefore is multiplied by (1− π)). If the fraction
of patient agents is less than ut, the bank will not run out of resources and the agent will receive return a1,t
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if she is impatient. If the fraction of impatient consumers is above ut, however, she will receive a1,t with
probability
¡
ut/u
¢
< 1 and zero otherwise. Finally, with probability (1− u) she will be patient and receive
the return a2,t as given in the final constraint. Note that if the fraction of impatient agents is above ut, the
bank runs out of resources in the first period and patient agents receive nothing.
This problem is difficult to address analytically, but an upper bound for a1,t can clearly be chosen large
enough to not be binding. Therefore, as long as the function π is well-behaved, the problem is one of
maximizing a continuous function over a compact set, and a solution must exist. We use
¡
a∗1,t, η
∗
t
¢
to
denote this solution.
Of course, type II agents always have the alternative of choosing not to participate in the banking system.
In this case, the agent will store some goods and invest the rest in capital formation. The payoff for an agent
taking this route is given by
max
ηt
Z 1
0
wγt
γ
¡
ub1 [ηtn+ (1− ηt)x]γ + (1− u) b2
£
ψt+1(1− ηt) + ηtn2
¤γ¢
f (u) du
subject to
0 ≤ ηt ≤ 1
If the probability of a bank run is very high, the agent will choose to remain in autarky. For a small enough
probability of a run, however, it is not hard to see that the agent will prefer to deposit in the bank in order to
insure against the preference shock. For some parameter values, the payoff from autarky is lower than the
payoff that the bank can achieve designing a contract that does not allows for runs. In this case, the agent
always chooses to participate in the banking system (this is the case for all of the examples in this paper).
3 Equilibrium
We now turn to the analysis of the equilibrium behavior of the economy. We first impose the market-
clearing conditions and derive the equilibrium law of motion for the capital stock as a function of the
contract offered by the bank. We then turn to some numerical examples in which we compute the solution
to the bank’s problem and simulate the equilibrium behavior of the economy.
3.1 Market clearing and aggregate investment
Firms are competitive and therefore factors are paid their marginal products
w∗t = (1− θ)k
1−θ
t k
θ
t
10
r∗t = θk
1−θ
t k
−(1−θ)
t .
In equilibrium all firms will choose the same capital-labor ratio, and therefore kt = kt must hold. The
equilibrium wage and rental rate therefore reduce to
w∗t = (1− θ) kt
r∗t = θ.
The marginal product of capital is constant in the Ak model, which is why the economy is always on a
balanced growth path.
In the market for existing capital, supply is given by (1− δ) kt. If the price of capital qt were greater
than 1R , we have from (2) that demand for capital would be zero because new investment would yield a
higher return. Therefore the market would not clear. Suppose instead that qt were below 1R . Then from
(2) we have that type I agents put all of their income into existing capital, so that total demand for existing
capital would be equal to
φ (1− θ) kt
qt
.
The market-clearing price would then be given by
qt = φ
(1− θ)
1− δ .
We assume
φ ≥ 1− δ
1− θ
µ
1
R
¶
(3)
holds, which implies that the candidate price above is at least 1R , contradicting our original supposition.
The role of type I agents in this model is to hold the stock of existing capital (which is completely illiquid)
between periods. The assumption in (3) is simply that there are enough type I agents in the economy to
prevent existing capital from trading at a discount. (Otherwise, if the discount were large enough, banks
might want to invest in existing capital as well.) The only remaining possibility is then qt = 1R . Under
condition (3) this price clears the market because the demand for capital is perfectly elastic (and large
enough). We state this result as a proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume condition (3). Then the equilibrium price of capital is given by
qt =
1
R
for all t.
Since we have shown both rt and qt to be constant over time, the bank’s problem is exactly the same in
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every period and the solution (η∗, a∗1) will be independent of time. In other words, the bank will offer the
same deposit contract in every period.
We use iIt to denote investment in new capital made by an individual type I agent. This must be equal
to the income of the agent less her purchases of existing capital. Using the market-clearing condition for
existing capital, we can write the total investment in new capital by type I agents as
φiIt = φwt − qt (1− δ) kt
=
µ
φ (1− θ)− 1− δ
R
¶
kt.
Finally, we need to calculate how much new investment is undertaken by banks. The amount of investment
per type II agent is given by
iIIt (ut) = (1− η)wt
¡
1− αi (ut)
¢
. (4)
In other words, new capital formation depends on the amount the bank invests and the fraction of that
investment that is not liquidated prematurely. Note that this quantity depends on the realization of ut. If the
realization is high, so that a large fraction of the population is impatient, the bank will need to liquidate a
large fraction of their investment in order to meet the demand for withdrawals. This will result in a lower
capital stock in the following period. Hence the aggregate uncertainty about liquidity demand leads to
equilibrium fluctuations in the growth rate of the capital stock and of output.
The law of motion for the capital stock is given by
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt +R
¡
φiIt + (1− φ) iIIt (ut)
¢
.
Since both iI and iII (ut) are linear functions of kt we have the following result.
Proposition 2 For any period t and stock of capital kt, the equilibrium growth rate of capital (kt+1/kt) is
a random variable g(u) independent of t. Furthermore, we have
g(u) ≡ R (1− θ)
£
φ+ (1− φ)
¡
1− η)(1− αi (u)
¢¤
, (5)
where u is a random variable with distribution f(u) when there is no run and u = 1 when there is a run.
The function αi (u) is given by
αi (u) =



0 if u < u
ua1−ηn
(1−η)x if u < u < u
1 if u > u
.
In summary, the difference equation describing the dynamic behavior of kt is linear and stochastic. Notice
that since η and the function αi are the same in every period, the growth rate is a time-invariant, weakly
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decreasing function of the realization of u. In equilibrium, aggregate output is given by Yt = kt and hence
the growth rate of output is the same as the growth rate of the capital stock in this economy.
Properties of this difference equation are difficult to derive analytically, because of the complexity of
the bank’s problem. We now look at some examples for which we can compute solutions and simulate the
equilibrium behavior of the economy.
3.2 Implications for growth
In this subsection we investigate the growth implications of the possibility of bank runs by computing a
representative example of the model presented in the previous section. In particular, consider the utility
function (1) with the following parameter values: γ = 0.4, b1 = 2.5 and b2 = 1. We take the capital share
of income θ to be equal to 0.4 and a 20% depreciation rate (δ = 0.2). The return on storage n is set equal
to 1 and the return on investment is given by the pair (R = 3, x = 0.3).17 We set the liquidation value of
investment x relatively low because for values of x closer to n the bank finds liquidated investment a not-
too-costly instrument for providing consumption to impatient agents. We want to make a clear distinction
between storage (which yields consumption goods) and investment (which yields capital), and a low value
of x is useful for this purpose. The total return on investment when not liquidated early is then given by
ψ = R (r + (1− δ)q) = 2.0
We assume that the value of u, the proportion of impatient agents in the population, is an independent
and identically distributed random variable with a distribution function given by a beta distribution with
parameters (3, 9). The mean value of u is 0.25 and the standard deviation is around 0.12. If the variance of
u is set very high, the effects of bank runs will not be substantially different from the effects of regularly
occurring high liquidity demand shocks. Bank runs, however, are extreme events and the way to capture
this in the present model is to assume a relatively low variance of u.
Given these parameter values and an ESM, we solve the bank’s problem numerically.18 We first consider
the standard sunspots story, where the probability of a run is a fixed number for all deposit contracts under
which both equilibria exist. It should be kept in mind that for a sufficiently high value of the probability
of a run, the bank might want to choose a contract that rules out a run as an equilibrium outcome (i.e., has
π = 0). In the present example, if the exogenous probability of a bank run is above 10 % the bank will
choose a contract that does not admit a run equilibrium.19 Furthermore, the payoff of autarky is smaller
17 For values of n < 1 patient consumers would rather consume early in their life than use the liquid technology for saving.
18 All calculations are done in Fortran. The source code is available from the authors upon request.
19 The best contract that prevents runs has some interesting characteristics. For the parameter values being considered (and for a
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than the payoff from this run-proof contract and hence type II agents always choose to participate in the
banking sector.
In Table 1 we present the solution of the bank’s problem for different levels of the probability of a bank-
run. Note that the fraction of liquid assets in the bank’s portfolio is increasing in the probability. As the
probability of a run increases, it becomes more likely that the bank will have to liquidate investment early.
But since the liquidation value is relatively low, the bank prefers to hold more of the liquid asset (storage)
to deal with a run if it occurs.
Table 1
Prob. of Run (π) a1 η Prob[u ≥ u] Prob[u ≥ u]
0.00 1.124 0.444 0.126 0.017
0.04 1.120 0.456 0.110 0.014
0.06 1.116 0.462 0.101 0.013
0.08 1.112 0.468 0.093 0.012
The last two columns of the table show the probability that the bank will liquidate some investment early
(Prob[u ≥ u]) and the probability that the bank will have to suspend payments in period t after running
out of resources (Prob[u ≥ u]), both conditional on the bank not suffering a run. We can see that as the
probability of a run increases, the bank chooses a more liquid portfolio, thereby reducing the chances that it
will have to liquidate investment early in the no-run situation (from over 0.12 to around 0.09). The higher
level of liquidity also implies that the bank will have to suspend payments less often when there is no run.
However, note that the reduction in the probability Prob[u ≥ u] is not enough to compensate the increase
in π. In other words, the unconditional probability of suspension increases with the probability of a run.
As a benchmark case, we take the probability of a bank run to be equal to 0.06 (when both equilibria
exist). Figure 1 shows the time series of the logarithm of the stock of capital for this economy in a represen-
tative 50 period simulation. It shows how a bank run causes an abrupt fall in the level of capital formation
in the economy. However, not all of the major downturns in this figure are due to bank runs. In periods
where the number of impatient agents ut is very high, the bank liquidates some investment early to pay
these agents, and this liquidation creates some of the observed fluctuations in the stock of capital. There are
four bank runs during these fifty periods, at t = 11, 29, 36, and 38. There is no bank-run, for example, at
t = 17 and 44.20
wide range around them) the “run-proof” contract has a relatively low level of storage in the bank’s portfolio and a relatively low
return on early withdrawals.
20 During the 50 years of the National Banking Era (1863-1914) there were five major bank panics: 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and
1907. The Federal Reserve System was established after that, partly as a response to those regular periods of crisis.
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In Table 2 we present the growth rate of capital (which in this economy is the same as the growth rate of
output) conditional on not having a run as well as the unconditional growth rate. This numbers are the result
of 20 simulations of 50 periods each. We consider the periods in this overlapping generations economy to
represent approximately 5 years and we report the annual growth rates.21
Table 2
Prob. of Run Growth Conditional on No Run Unconditional Growth
0.00 5.77% 5.77%
0.04 5.65% 5.37%
0.06 5.61% 5.15%
0.08 5.55% 4.93%
Note that the unconditional growth rate of the economy tends to be lower for economies with a higher
probability of a bank-run. Two effects combine to generate this fact. First, the average growth rate of the
economy when there is no run (the conditional-on-no-run growth rate) is lower because the bank places
more resources in storage and fewer in investment. This is the effect isolated in the middle column of the
table. Second, bank runs induce early liquidation when they occur, and that also reduces capital formation
21 Miron ([18]) studies banking panics in the US during the period 1890-1908. He estimates that the probability of a financial
panic in any given year was around 0.30. We are considering much lower probabilities of sunspot-driven runs in our computations.
However, two factors make our numbers reasonable. First, the banking system in our model may experience distress due to
unusually high levels of the proportion of impatient agents u. In fact, conditional on no run, there is around a ten percent
probability of early liquidation of investment in our calibration (see Table 1). Some of these events would be included in Miron’s
definition of a panic. Second, the period studied by Miron seems to be a period with unusually high frequency of runs. Miron also
reports the growth rate of output during these 18 years. The growth rate conditional on no run was 6.82% and the unconditional
growth rate was 3.75% (see our Table 2 for comparison).
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on average. Both of these effects are detrimental for long run growth.
So far we have taken the standard sunspots approach to equilibrium selection, where the bank takes the
probability of a run as exogenously given and believes that it cannot influence the probability by changing
the composition of its portfolio. However, it seems intuitively plausible that the portfolio chosen by the
bank might actually be a useful predictor of the likelihood of a run. In other words, if the bank chooses
a contract that is “closer” to a contract that would eliminate the run equilibrium, it seems reasonable to
think that the probability of having a run might go down. In the next section we describe an alternative
approach that yields an equilibrium selection mechanism with this property, and we investigate the growth
implications of the new mechanism.
4 Risk Factor Based Equilibrium Selection
In this section we examine a more general ESM where the probability of a run can vary continuously
with the deposit contract chosen by the bank. It seems entirely reasonable to think that the outcome of the
post-deposit game can depend on the relative payoffs obtained by agent in the alternative scenarios, even
when both outcomes are Nash equilibria. This is, in fact, precisely the idea that motivates the use of risk
dominance as an equilibrium selection mechanism (Harsanyi and Selten [16]).22 However, risk dominance
selects a single equilibrium for each contract that the bank could choose. In other words, whereas the
sunspots approach assigns a fixed probability to the run equilibrium (whenever it exists), risk dominance
assigns a probability of either zero or one, depending on the contract. We find this unappealing because it
implies that the bank can rule out runs entirely by choosing a contract that makes the no-run equilibrium
barely risk dominant (while a very similar contract would lead to a run with certainty). We find a proba-
bilistic approach much more realistic. In our approach, a run is more likely to occur when the equilibrium
is risk dominant, but still can occur when it is not. In other words, we keep the idea that under certain
circumstances a bank run is, to some extent, a chance event. However, the likelihood of this chance event
now depends on the actions of the bank. Starting from any contract that permits a run equilibrium, slightly
reducing the relative payoff of running will slightly reduce the probability of a run. Of course, there are still
contracts for which only a bank run can happen, or for which a run cannot happen; these are the situations
where only one of the equilibria of the post deposit game exists. However, we believe that when both equi-
libria exist, each one can obtain and therefore should be assigned positive probability. Hence our approach
retains the probabilistic property of the sunspots approach while allowing the portfolio decision of the bank
22 See Temzelides [20] for an evolutionary justification of using risk dominance as the equilibrium selection mechanism in a
model with bank runs. Catalan [9] uses the risk dominance approach to study the relationships between the bank’s balance sheet,
deposit insurance, and the likelihood of runs.
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to influence the probability of a run.
Specifically, we assume that the probability of a run π is a decreasing function of the risk factor of the
run equilibrium. We begin by defining the risk factor.23
Definition: The risk factor of the run equilibrium is the smallest probability ρ such that if a patient agent
believes that all other agents will run with probability strictly greater than ρ, then running is her unique
optimal action.
The risk factor is therefore determined by the following expression,
ρuaγ1 + (1− ρ)
ÃZ u
0
aγ1f(u)du+
Z 1
u
u
u
aγ1f(u)du
!
= (1− ρ)
Z u
0
aγ2(u)f(u)du.
The left-hand side of this expression is the expected value for a patient agent of running to the bank when
she believes that with probability ρ everybody else will run. The right-hand side is the expected value of not
running given the same belief. The expression says that if a patient agent assigns probability ρ to the event
of a run on the bank, she is indifferent between running and not running. If she assigns a higher probability
to a run, she would strictly prefer to run. We assume that the higher the risk factor of the run equilibrium, the
lower the probability of a run. Whatever determines the individual agent’s prior belief about the possibility
of a run on the banking system, the higher the risk factor ρ, the lower the likelihood that this belief will be
greater than ρ, and hence the lower the likelihood that the agent would decide to run.
Holding other things constant, the risk factor of the run equilibrium is decreasing in the return offered on
period t withdrawals a1. Higher values of a1 increase the incentive for agents to withdraw their funds from
the bank early. They also make not running less attractive because even if there is no run, the bank will have
fewer resources in period t + 1 and hence a2 will be lower. The relationship between the risk factor and
η, the fraction of the bank’s portfolio that is in storage, is not monotonic. If η is very low, then with high
probability the realization of ut will be such that investment is liquidated. In such a situation, increasing η
decreases the amount of liquidation and therefore increases the amount of resources available in the second
period. This makes waiting a more attractive strategy, and as a result the risk factor is increasing in η.
If, on the other hand, η is very high, then with high probability the realization of ut will be such that no
investment is liquidated. In this case decreasing η would increase the resources available in the second
period, and hence the risk factor is decreasing in η. For moderate values of η, the risk factor is fairly flat
and the effects of a change in a1 will typically dominate the effects of a change in η.
In earlier work, we have shown how an adaptive learning process in a stochastic environment naturally
23 See Young [22] for an extended discussion of risk factors and risk dominance.
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generates an equilibrium selection mechanism in which the probability of an equilibrium is strictly decreas-
ing in its risk factor (see Ennis and Keister [12]). Because our goal here is to examine the basic implications
that follow from this approach, the exact relationship between the risk factor of the run equilibrium and the
probability of a run is not very important. Rather than specifying a learning model, we posit a simple linear
relationship of the form
π(ρ) = m− h · ρ,
where m and h are constants that allow us to calibrate the equilibrium probability π to a reasonable num-
ber.24 We are interested in studying the growth implications of the fact that the bank recognizes that its
choice of contract influences the likelihood of a run. For this we compare the outcomes in two different
economies. In one, banks are sophisticated decision makers and realize the endogeneity of the likelihood of
runs. In the other, banks are naive and take the probability as given even though their decisions do influence
it. For this second case we concentrate on the rational expectations equilibrium (i.e., the probability taken
as given by the bank is confirmed by their decision, given the equilibrium selection function π(ρ)). We
continue our analysis using the example introduced in the previous section. We assume that m = 0.1 and
h = 0.05.
Table 3 shows the solution to the problem for both the sophisticated and the naive bank.
Table 3
a∗1 η
∗ π∗
Growth
Conditional on No Run
Unconditional
Growth
Sophisticated Bank 0.995 0.415 0.085 6.47% 5.77%
Naive Bank 1.110 0.473 0.091 5.51% 4.78%
As expected, the sophisticated bank chooses a contract that implies a higher risk factor for the run
equilibrium and thereby lowers the probability of a run π∗. The bank does this by lowering a1 and η. These
adjustments in the contract may seem not very intuitive at first but they are a direct consequence of the
equilibrium selection process we are considering. By lowering a1 and η, the bank lowers the contingent
payoff from running to the bank and increases the payoff of waiting to withdraw in the second period of life.
The lower value of a1 allows the bank to put more resources into investment without having to liquidate
more often. This leads to a larger return for agents who arrive in the second period. Notice that this is the
opposite of the narrow-banking proposal of Friedman [14]. Friedman argued that demand deposits should
24 If the slope of the function π is very high the bank will have an incentive to make ρ high enough to eliminate the runs. We are
interested in studying situations where runs are possible and we hence calibrate the value of h to be relatively small. Furthermore,
it is quite possible that for large changes in ρ the linearity assumption about the equilibrium selection function π(ρ) is not really
appropriate. Finally, note that when h = 0 holds, this equilibrium selection mechanism reduces to the standard sunspots approach
studied earlier.
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be backed entirely by safe, short term assets (such as storage in our model). This would enable the bank to
meet all of their obligations during a run, which would in turn prevent a run from happening. The problem
with this approach is that preventing the bank from undertaking investment is costly because investment
offers a much higher return than storage. (See Wallace [21].) Our analysis shows that a better approach for
a bank facing the possibility of a run is to structure the contract to reward agents heavily for waiting. This
involves holding fewer liquid assets and putting more resources into (illiquid) investment. In addition, the
narrow-banking proposal is aimed at eliminating runs entirely. We see here that, at least from the standpoint
of the welfare of generation t depositors, it is not optimal for the bank to eliminate the possibility of a run.
The bank chooses to reduce the probability, but not all the way to zero.
The last two columns give the implications of these differences for the growth rate of the economy.
The economy with sophisticated banks has both a higher level of investment and a lower return on early
withdrawals. These two facts tend to increase the growth rate of the economy in periods with no runs.
In such periods, the economy with sophisticated banks grows at an average rate that is 89 basis point
higher than the economy with naive banks. Furthermore, the economy with sophisticated banks has a lower
equilibrium probability of bank runs. Bank runs are detrimental to the process of capital formation and
hence reduce the average growth rate of the economy. When we take the lower frequency of runs into
account, the economy with sophisticated banks grows on average around 92 basis points faster than the
economy with naive banks.
In tables 4 and 5 we further study the economy with sophisticated banks. Table 4 shows that when h (the
sensitivity of the equilibrium selection function to the risk factor of the run equilibrium) is higher, the bank
chooses less liquidity and a lower return on early withdrawals. These two changes have the direct effect of
increasing capital formation and hence increasing the growth rate of the economy. In addition, the change
in the contract reduces the probability of bank runs, and this further increases the long-run average growth
rate. In other words, the more influence the bank’s portfolio has on the likelihood of runs, the faster the
economy will grow.
Table 4
(m,h) a∗1 η
∗ π∗ Growth
(0.1, 0.05) 0.995 0.415 0.085 5.77%
(0.1, 0.06) 0.980 0.405 0.082 5.93%
In Table 5 we present the equilibrium outcome for different values of the return on the investment
technology and the liquidation cost.
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Table 5
(R, x) a∗1 η
∗ π∗ Growth
(3.00, 0.3) 0.995 0.415 0.085 5.77%
(3.25, 0.3) 0.971 0.398 0.084 7.64%
(3.00, 0.4) 1.015 0.378 0.086 6.12%
The growth rate is higher for higher values ofR for several reasons. The first is apparent from (5). When
a fixed amount of investment yields more capital, the economy will grow faster. The second reason is also
standard: when investment offers a higher return, banks will choose to invest more. However, in our model
there is also a third effect. An increase in investment implies that banks are giving a relatively higher payoff
to agents in the second period, and hence the risk factor of the run equilibrium is higher. Thus the change
in the bank’s portfolio also decreases the probability of a bank run, which increases the long run average
growth rate even more.
In economies where the liquidation cost of investment is lower (higher values of x), the bank would
again choose to place more resources in investment. However, the bank would increase the return for early
withdrawals because early liquidation is less costly. This second effects tends to decrease the risk factor
of running and hence in this case the probability of a run increases. Here the two effects are pointing in
opposite directions with respect to long-run growth: more investment tends to raise the average growth rate,
while a higher frequency of bank runs lowers it. In our example the first effect dominates, because the
movement in η is much larger than the change in π. As a result, the long-run average growth rate goes up.
5 Concluding Remarks
We conclude by offering some remarks on possible extensions and modifications of the model that could
be used to address some additional issues regarding the relationship between growth and banking crises.
Richer Models of Growth
In order to address the issue of how the economy responds in the short run to a crisis, our banking model
could be embedded in a richer growth model where transitional dynamics play a role. The model in Jones
and Manuelli [17] and the model of inventive activity in Antinolfi, Keister, and Shell [1] may be promising
candidates. In both cases, the marginal product of capital would increase in the period after the run because
of the decrease in the stock of capital. This would lead banks to shift their portfolios toward investment,
which would increase the growth rate during the transition. In addition, our analysis above shows that this
change in portfolios would decrease the probability of a run (this is similar to the middle line of Table 4),
which would on average lead to a faster recovery. As the economy approaches a balanced growth path,
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the marginal product of capital would gradually fall and banks would gradually shift their portfolios back
toward more storage. Hence the probability of a run would increase back to its original level. The main
obstacle to performing this analysis is computational. Because the return on capital would constantly be
changing, the bank’s problem would need to be solved separately in each period.
The Welfare Cost of Bank Runs
Another potentially interesting extension would be an analysis of the welfare cost of bank runs. In our
model, as in Peck and Shell [19], allowing bank runs to occur with positive probability can be part of
the (constrained) optimal risk-sharing arrangement among depositors in generation t. That is, taking the
equilibrium selection mechanism as given, the utility of these depositors can be higher under a contract
that allows runs to occur than under any contract that does not allow them. However, much of the cost
of a bank run is external to this group. As is evident from Figure 1, a bank run has a permanent effect
and the capital stock and real output never recover to the original trend. Therefore all future generations
suffer as a consequence of a run today. The question then arises whether bank runs can occur with positive
probability in a (constrained) Pareto optimal allocation in a dynamic model.25 The overlapping generations
framework seems well suited to address this issue because it is, as Cass and Shell [8] argue, “the only
genuinely dynamic, basically disaggregative framework available” for macroeconomic analysis (p.260). In
particular, the external effect arises because the model recognizes that a new set of agents will populate
the economy in the future, and today’s depositors do not take the welfare of these agents into account. It
seems possible that the long-run damage caused by a bank run is so large that allowing runs with positive
probability cannot be optimal in the dynamic setting.
The Correlation Between Bank Runs and Liquidity Demand
The seasonality of liquidity demand and its implications for the timing of bank runs has received a fair
amount of attention in the banking literature. Miron [18] estimates that bank panics in the U.S. prior to
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System were substantially more likely to occur in seasons with
high loan demand or low deposit demand. One way of investigating this issue in our model would be to
have the distribution of the number of impatient agents (represented by the function f ) cycle over time
between, say, one distribution with a relatively low mean and another with a higher mean. In this way
liquidity demand would have a clear seasonal pattern over time but remain random. The bank would choose
different portfolios under the different distributions, and the incentive for an agent to run (as measured by
the risk factor of the run equilibrium) would reflect both the change in f and the portfolio change. It would
25 One difficulty with performing this analysis is finding the proper concept of Pareto optimality to use in this setting. See
Balasko and Shell [2] for a discussion of different concepts of optimality in overlapping generations models.
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be interesting to see if such a setup could deliver the stylized fact that runs are more common in periods
where liquidity demand is expected to be high.
An alternate approach would be to change the timing of events in the model so that agents gain some
information about the number of impatient depositors ut before they decide whether or not to go to the bank
in period t. The bank’s portfolio choice would be made before this information is revealed and therefore
would remain constant over time. The information about ut would certainly be useful for an agent in
deciding whether or not to run – a high value of ut implies that the bank will need to liquidate investment
to pay depositors, which implies a lower return for agents who wait to withdraw in period t+1. In this way
the effect of high liquidity demand on the incentive for an agent to run could be isolated, and it seems likely
that the correlation between liquidity demand and the probability of a run would be positive. Of course,
studying seasonality requires interpreting a time period as being fairly short (less than a year). Hence some
modification of our overlapping generations setup might be desirable for such an analysis.
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